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Few, if any, Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”)
decisions in recent years have stirred up more controversy than the
recent vote to eliminate or alter certain of its mass media ownership
1
rules. Taken as a whole these revisions will allow a somewhat
increased ownership concentration of electronic mass media and
2
greater cross ownership of electronic mass media and print media.
This determination is described as one of the most important in the
FCC’s history, and one with enormous implications for the right to

∗

William Fishman has practiced telecommunications law for thirty-five years,
both for the government and in private practice. He is a graduate of Brown University
and Harvard Law School.
1. Broadcast Ownership Rules, Cross-Ownership of Broadcast Stations and
Newspapers, Multiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in Local Markets, and
Definition of Radio Markets, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,286 (Aug. 5, 2003) (to be codified at 47
C.F.R. pt. 73) [hereinafter 2003 Broadcast Ownership Rules].
2. See id. (increasing the ownership of television (“TV”) stations serving from
thirty-five percent to forty-five percent of national viewers and establishing cross
ownership media limits for newspapers and broadcasters as well as radio and TV
stations within the same markets).
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3

freedom of speech. Storms of protest appeared in a variety of public
fora, and both houses of Congress made efforts to nullify the FCC’s
4
decision. At present, the legality of the FCC’s decision is under
5
review in the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
FORWARD
This paper does not undertake the strictly legal defense of the
FCC’s decision. My purpose in these remarks is to address issues
broader than the narrow legal questions with which the parties and
the Third Circuit will wrestle. I will not provide detailed descriptions
of the FCC’s new policies and extensive citation to the record or to
the FCC’s decision. Rather, this paper addresses whether the FCC’s
new rules, which permit somewhat greater concentration of mass
media ownership, represent a serious public policy concern. Of
course, these narrow legal issues are part of a spectrum of public
policy questions that deserve careful review; but I leave that to others.
My perspective is a result of my more than thirty-five years working
on communications issues; at the FCC, the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration, and in
representing many broadcast and non-broadcast clients. As a retired
member of the bar, I have no client interests to protect. This does
not guarantee that my opinions are correct or beyond criticism, or
even entitled to greater weight than those of a commercial or other
programmatic advocate. However, it does mean that the views
expressed here are purely my own, honestly, if not mistakenly
formed.
My principal thesis is that the FCC’s decision is entirely
appropriate, balanced, consistent with applicable law, and squarely in
the public interest. Everyone concerned with this subject can agree
that protection of the First Amendment right to free speech is one of
the bedrock principles of our society, and that no effort should be
spared to protect those rights. In the present context, by statute and
precedent, the key protections are the statutory encouragement of

3. Cheryl Leanza and Harold Feld, More Than “A Toaster With Pictures”: Defending
Media Ownership Limits, 21 COMM. L. 12, 19 (2003); Tom Shales, Michael Powell and the
FCC: Giving Away the Marketplace of Ideas, WASH. POST, June 2, 2003, at C1.
4. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 629, 118
Stat. 1, 97 (2004) (directing the FCC to modify the national television ownership
limit to thirty-nine percent).
5. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, No. 03-3388, 2003 WL 22052896, at *1 (3d
Cir. Sept. 3, 2003) (granting stay pending full judicial review of the FCC’s rules
regarding media ownership).
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localism, diversity, and competition in the provision of broadcast and
broadcast-related newspaper ownership.
Yet, to the extent the FCC’s resolution of the issues before it in the
consolidated docket countenances some additional concentration of
control, it does not weaken First Amendment values, as many critics
6
seem to assume. As I will argue below, it actually boosts First
Amendment protections by assuring that the private sector, which
applies free market principles, can create well-resourced,
experienced, and knowledgeable organizations better able to
balance, or at a minimum to challenge, the overwhelming coercive
powers of government. It is also important to balance the public’s
7
rights—admittedly the core concerns of the Communications Act —
with the practicalities of free market principles. Many of the
criticisms seem to be premised on the notion that we should strive for
the last humanly achievable degree of analytical and implementable
perfection and finality in our analysis and resolution of the mass
media concentration issues. I consider this unrealistic, and, if
implemented, a serious misallocation of public resources which
might better serve other pressing matters. Finally, I think there is a
disturbing undercurrent of hostility towards the private sector
animating much of the criticism.
I.

WHAT THE FCC HAS DONE

As required by Section 161(a), enacted as part of the
8
Telecommunications Act of 1996, the FCC has conducted biennial
reviews of its ownership rules. In its most recent review, taking
account of unprecedented developments in the mass media, such as
the growth of cable, direct broadcast satellite (“DBS”), and Internet
9
access, as well as recent judicial directives, the FCC concluded that its
six major ownership rules must be revised. Under the twin statutory
obligations that seek to (1) foster localism, diversity, and competition
6. See, e.g., Testimony of Dr. Mark N. Cooper, Director of Research on Media
Ownership, Before the Senate Commerce Committee, at 3 (Oct. 2, 2003), at
www.consumerfed.org/mediatestimony.pdf (arguing that the FCC has adopted a
narrow view of the First Amendment, “offensive to the traditions of vibrant civic
discourse”).
7. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 655, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at
47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (2000)).
8. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, Title IV, § 402(a), 110
Stat. 129 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 161(a) (2000)).
9. See, e.g., Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1053 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (vacating the FCC’s decision not to repeal or modify the national television
station ownership (“NTSO”) rule and remanding it to the FCC for further
proceedings); Sinclair Broad. Group v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 169 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(remanding the local ownership rule to the FCC for further consideration).
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in the electronic media, and (2) eliminate any of its existing
ownership rules no longer deemed necessary to achieve those
objectives, the FCC revised its national television (“TV”) ownership
rule to raise the ceiling to forty-five percent. The local TV ownership
limits were revised to permit a single ownership for up to two stations
in a seventeen station market, and up to three stations in a market of
eighteen or more stations, but in no event common ownership of any
two of the top four stations in a market. The radio-TV cross
ownership rule and newspaper-broadcast cross ownership rules were
eliminated and replaced by new cross ownership media limits. The
local radio ownership rule was altered but the dual network rule
remained unchanged.
10
The FCC’s decision is some 250 pages long. It contains detailed
legal analysis of the statutory framework, a history of the multiple
ownership rules, and extensive policy analysis of the available options.
The proceeding was one of the most extensive in the FCC’s history,
including three separate Notices of Proposed Rulemaking, many
public hearings, over fifteen months of comment time and receipt of
11
hundreds of thousands of comments from the public. The FCC
commissioned a number of media ownership studies to guide its
deliberations and invited public comments on those studies. The
decision carefully analyzes many proposed revisions as well as their
relationships to each other and to the policy goals dictated by the
Communications Act and applicable court precedent. It considered
the meaning of localism, diversity, and competition in the context of
the electronic media, particularly in relation to the vast explosion of
relatively recent media outlets which can, in various ways, compete
with and provide alternatives for the traditional broadcast and print
media. Each of the revised rules was carefully formulated and a
rationale for its adoption is provided in the decision.
10. See Federal Communications Commission, Report and Order Setting Limits
on Media Concentration (Jul. 2, 2003) (256 pages), available at http://hraunfoss.
fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-03-127A1.doc.
11. There appears to be some dispute about the actual number of comments.
Commissioner Copps claims there were close to 750,000 public filings. Statement of
Commissioner Michael J. Copps, dissenting, Regarding the 2002 Biennial Regulatory
Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules Adopted Pursuant
to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, at 2 (June 1, 2003)
[hereinafter Statement of Copps], available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_
public/attachmatch/DOC-235047A9.pdf. In its stay petition in the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit, Prometheus claims there were two million opposition
comments. Brief for Appellant at 11, Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 2003 WL
22052896 (3d Cir. Sept. 3, 2003) (No. 03-3388). But of course this is a relatively
trivial distinction. All parties conceded the massive extent of the public filings and
that they were disproportionately opposed to the proposed rule revisions.
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II. OBJECTIONS AND CRITICISMS
Despite the FCC’s thoroughness in revising the rules, the criticism
is widespread and passionate. The gist of that criticism seems to be
that the ownership rules, as revised, will permit further concentration
of mass media ownership.
Critics contend that additional
concentration will dilute localism, diversity of viewpoint, and
competition. There is also considerable criticism of the rulemaking
process itself; including allegations that the inadequacy of the FCC’s
consideration of the subject matter has led directly to misconceived
rules. Perhaps the most vehement and elaborate criticism comes
from Commissioner Copps and Commissioner Adelstein, both
Democrats on a Republican-controlled five member panel.
Commissioner Copps contends that the FCC’s decision is
substantively wrong because it “empowers America’s new Media Elite
with unacceptable levels of influence over the media on which our
12
society and our democracy so heavily depend.” The FCC, he says,
“surrenders to a handful of corporations awesome power over our
news, information and entertainment . . . [and] treat[s] the media
like any other big business, trusting that in the unforgiving
environment of the market, the public interest will somehow
magically trump the urge to build power and profit for a privileged
13
few.”
I respect Commissioner Copps. He is bright, thoughtful and
passionate about his work. But I find the sentiments quoted above
from his dissent deeply disturbing. They convey a mind set which is
anti-business and hostile to principles that lie at the heart of the free
market economy. Modern American capitalism, imperfect as it is, has
created the widest diffusion of wealth and the greatest standard of
living ever known. Not incidentally, it has also produced a free
speech environment unmatched anywhere in the world. The socalled “Media Elite,” a description which I believe is intended to be
opprobrious, are large, publicly-owned corporations. There is
nothing disreputable about them, or their motives, and suggestions
to the contrary are mere rhetoric at best and doctrinaire cant at
worst.

12. Statement of Copps, supra note 11, at l.
13. Id.
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III. THE COMMISSION’S DECISION IS FULLY JUSTIFIED
AND ENTITLED TO SUPPORT
While space does not permit a detailed refutation of Commissioner
Copps’ dissenting views, at least his major concerns can be briefly
addressed. He contends that the majority’s decision violates the law
14
because it does not encourage localism, diversity, and competition.
But the FCC’s decision describes in detail how the new rules can
reasonably be expected to accomplish those objectives. The decision
notes that the vast profusion of new media outlets, such as 500
channel cable systems, nationwide DBS systems, the Internet, and
other new electronic distribution media, have radically altered the
landscape.
Commissioner Copps criticizes the FCC’s own studies, but provides
15
no detailed analysis of their alleged shortcomings. He repeatedly
suggests that a more detailed analysis of various rule changes should
have occurred, and implies that such further analysis would have
changed the results. A great variety of constituent issues, he says,
16
should have been specifically addressed but were not. He asserts
that individual markets should have been subjected to detailed
17
review and further public comments on various aspects of the rules
18
should have been sought and analyzed.
There may well be substantive merit to some of his critique. One
can always do more, consider more, think longer or deeper, but
neither common sense nor the law requires that the FCC, or any
administrative agency, is obligated to seek a degree of
comprehensiveness or profundity which is unrealistic and would
require incremental effort disproportionate to the presumptive
19
improvement in the analysis.
To choose one element of the dissent for further discussion,
Commissioner Copps notes that the FCC assumes that greater
efficiencies will produce more news. While observing that “[t]here is
14. See id. at 3 (opining that the majority decision has resulted in centralization,
uniformity and monopoly).
15. See id. at 5 (condemning the FCC for its failure to subject its studies to public
scrutiny and questioning the soundness of its methodology).
16. See id. (dismissing the FCC’s review as a “meagerly financed inquir[y] that
ignored many of the most critical questions”).
17. See id. at 6 (stating that such individualized review could address
displacement of local voices as a result of mergers).
18. See id. at 6 (asserting that a sixty to ninety day public comment period would
have established “concrete input, analysis, and testing”).
19. See 47 U.S.C. § 161(a)(2) (2000) (“The [Federal Communications]
Commission . . . shall determine whether any such regulation is no longer necessary
in the public interest as the result of meaningful economic competition between
providers of such service.”).
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20

no record to support such a sweeping conclusion,” he makes his
own sweeping conclusion that “[m]aximizing the number of
independent owners increases the likelihood of a wider range of
21
viewpoints.”
Apart from the inconsistency in demanding record
support for views he contests while simply asserting what he
personally believes to be true, the basic problem is that no one really
knows or can know how these complex interactive matters will work
themselves out in the real world. The factors involved in the
provision of broadcast content surely include distribution
technologies, access to capital, return on investment, pursuit of
market share, advertising revenues and leverage, program production
arrangements and financing, cultural imperatives and limits,
protection of intellectual property, and public service obligations. To
take a concrete example, the AOL-Time Warner merger, which
involved a hideously complex web of corporate and programming
22
relationships, was widely touted at the time as the most important in
history. It now appears to have failed to produce the benefits to the
merger applicants anticipated at the time of its advocacy and
23
approval.
I have no difficulty imagining that a smaller number of more
professional, better resourced broadcasters or networks will do a
better job of providing news and a diversity of viewpoints, than will a
24
larger cadre of impecunious, barely surviving local outlets.
As
Chairman Powell noted in recent Congressional testimony, the
record shows that broadcast network owned-and-operated stations
better served their local communities with respect to local news
production, and TV broadcast-newspaper combinations produced a
25
dramatically better quality and quantity of local broadcast news. To
20. Statement of Copps, supra note 11, at l5.
21. Id. at 16.
22. See Alec Klein, FCC Clears Way for AOL Time Warner Inc., Vote is 5-0, But
Conditions on Messaging Draw Dissents, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2001, at A1 (referring to
the combination of print and entertainment media giant Time Warner and AOL, the
nations largest e-mail provider, as “the biggest merger in corporate history, a
marriage of old- and new-media titans.”).
23. See Tim Burt, et al., It Has Been Four Years Since the Troubled Merger With AOL,
FIN. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2003, at 23 (calling the merger “one of the worst deals in US
corporate history,” and enumerating problems with writeoffs, management turnover,
stock price instability, government investigations, management upheaval, and the
resignations of the merger’s leaders).
24. Anyone, like me, who has worked at a small local broadcast outlet, knows
only too well that “rip and read” is generally the sum total of the news operation.
25. Broadcast Ownership Biennial Review: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce,
Sci., & Transp., 108th Cong. 10 (2003) (written statement of Michael K. Powell,
Chairman, FCC), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/
DOC-235127A1.doc.
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put the matter differently, it is not that diversity, localism, or
competition are unimportant; quite the contrary, everyone agrees
they are crucial. Certainly the Communications Act directs the FCC
to give great weight to localism, diversity, and media competition.
The real question is how to achieve these goals. Simple reliance on
close-to-the-ground local activists sounds mechanistic and even
doctrinaire in the sense that it appears to replicate the Jeffersonian
26
notion that democracy can best flourish in a nation of small farmers.
I do not mean to suggest that all of Commissioner Copp’s views
lack merit. I agree with him that broadcast licensees have a special
duty to serve the public interest and it is quite clear that in many
cases they do not. The remedy is to require additional public interest
programming at license renewal time or to impose some sort of
special purpose tax on the broadcast industry to fund noncommercial programming. Alternatively, if Congress and the public
are not happy with the present law and the performance of existing
licensees, thought should be given to adoption of an auction or
lottery system like those used for cellular telephony, with the revenue
used to provide or subsidize programming which is not otherwise
available.
Similarly, Commissioner Copps’ concern that merger applicants
should be required to detail their plans for discharging the merged
27
entity’s public interest obligations is well taken. One has to assume
that when prima facie issues of concern about a particular merger are
presented, the FCC will examine them conscientiously, regardless of
whether the proposed merger would comply on its face with the new
ownership rules. The relatively low level of female and minority
media ownership was among the most important issues whose
discussion was precluded as a practical matter by the sheer weight
and complexity of the biennial review. But again those issues are
outside the scope of the multiple ownership decision or will be
28
addressed later by the FCC.

26. See JEAN M. YARBROUGH, AMERICAN VIRTUES: THOMAS JEFFERSON ON THE
CHARACTER OF A FREE PEOPLE 60 (1988) (noting Jefferson’s assertion that “the broad
competence of the farmer in all matters relating to his own well-being provides a
solid foundation for republican self-government”).
27. Statement of Copps, supra note 11, at l8.
28. See Press Release, FCC, Chairman Powell Announces Intention to Form a
Federal Advisory Committee to Assist the Federal Communications Commission in
Addressing Diversity Issues (May 19, 2003) [hereinafter Advisory Committee]
(discussing the role of the Diversity Committee, which includes advising the FCC on
practices to increase diversity in the communications sector and reporting
periodically on its progress), at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/
attachmatch/ DOC-234645A1.pdf (on file with the American University Law Review).
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More broadly, we live in an imperfect world. The record before
the FCC is massive, and the decision is detailed, thoughtful, and
balanced. The additional data gathering and analysis suggested by
Commissioner Copps would add to the already bloated record,
further delay the decision, and lead to even more refined analysis of
what is not really reducible to the degree of certitude he seems to
29
want. The communication industry is very complex, involving rapid
technological developments and areas where rational decisions
cannot go beyond informed judgment. If the FCC has not produced
a defensible decision on the basis of the existing record, it is unlikely
that an incremental round of yet more comments will shine the light
of pure reason on the outcome. Hundreds of thousands of
comments should be sufficient to permit a public body to inform
itself of the merits, exercise its collective judgment, and move on to
the next urgent matter on its agenda.
Searching for the perfect solution drives out good ones and, as
30
Keynes so famously noted, “in the long run we’re all dead.” In this
context it is noteworthy that the statutory obligation to conduct
biennial reviews of the ownership rules imposes enormous logistical
and administrative burdens on the FCC. Of course, it also means the
issues will be reexamined again in two years. It may be that the
Congress’ desire to have constantly updated review of the ownership
rules will actually have the effect of weakening any one analytical
exercise because of the hangover from the last review or the need to
prepare for the next. In sum, it seems to me that Commissioner
Copps is looking for a degree of granularity that is unattainable in
the real world and that the Congress may simply have outsmarted
itself by compelling the FCC to conduct a virtually constant review of
its media ownership rules.
And even if it were attainable, would it really lead to a more
appropriate decision? We are not, after all, fitting a curve to a series
of data points. The core issues are inherently difficult to address in
formulaic fashion. While criticism of the FCC’s diversity index is
widespread, the fact is that “diversity,” whether it is ownership or
31
viewpoint diversity, is a very difficult concept to address. The
29. See generally Frank Aherns, Media Giants Getting Together, WASH. POST, Nov. 6,
2003, at E1 (describing just a few segments of the industry via a spaghetti diagram
which dramatically illustrates the interwoven nature of the broadcast, newspaper, and
Internet industries).
30. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TRACT ON MONETARY REFORM 80 (1923).
31. See FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 796-97 (1978)
(noting that “‘diversity and its effects are . . . elusive concepts, not easily defined let
alone measured’”) (quoting Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad. v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938,
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multifaceted nature of the subject industries, the public’s shifting
tastes and preferences, the rapidly evolving technology, and the everchanging availability of capital, would render a decision with a higher
degree of certainty difficult to obtain. One cannot say that the FCC’s
decision rests neatly and compellingly in perfect conjunction, on the
one hand of data gathering and analysis, and on the other of its
resources and other obligations. But, one can say that it is hard to
show that it rests so far outside those parameters that it is legally
suspect. I just cannot work up much anxiety over an increase in the
allowed national TV ownership limit to forty-five percent from the
prior thirty-five percent when the data show that no one outlet
routinely attracts more than a tiny percentage of the national
audience. The only real significance of the increase would be to
permit certain TV networks to acquire a few additional local outlets
to increase the cash flowing to them from clearance of their network
programming.
As indicated above, this essay does not purport to provide legal
analysis of the sufficiency of the FCC’s decision to withstand judicial
review. Over many years of appellate advocacy I have learned to my
chagrin that the outcomes of such matters are not easily predicted.
But by the normal standards of review this decision is easily
sustainable for all the reasons alluded to above. The FCC has done a
more than credible job gathering and analyzing data and formulating
policy based on those data. Section 202(h)’s command to remove
any ownership rules not “necessary” in the public interest certainly
sounds like a presumption to me. Procedural claims that the Notices
issued by the FCC provided inadequate warning under the
Administrative Procedure Act, that the FCC failed to adequately
consider public comments or to justify its policy choices, are strained
and, as in the case of the substantive objections, simply seek to reach
an unrealistic level of detail and comprehensiveness. There will be
other dockets in the near future dealing with issues such as minority
32
and female ownership.
The public can always petition for rule
making with respect to any particular issue or file petitions to deny
any proposed merger or acquisition, and there are many issues that
certainly deserve careful scrutiny. Nor should we lose sight of the
coordinate jurisdiction of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the
961 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). Undoubtedly, the FCC’s diversity index, which on its face is
an incomplete and inconclusive concept, was prompted by judicial criticism of prior
FCC media ownership decisions in which there was no serious effort to quantify
diversity in particular markets.
32. See Advisory Committee, supra note 28.
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Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) in the application of antitrust law
to broadcasters and newspaper publishers. The Communications Act
imposes a different standard than do the antitrust laws, but where
allegations of undue concentration of control arise, the FCC is not
33
the only arena in which to formally address such matters.
Moreover, if there are deficiencies in FCC decisions, petitions for
reconsideration are always available to disgruntled parties. Similarly,
the suggestion that the FCC will merely rubberstamp any merger
applications filed pursuant to its new rules is difficult to accept. It is
well known that the FCC is bound to consider petitions to deny
meeting a minimal threshold as well as waiver petitions. It is hard to
believe that when presented with prima facie evidence that one or
both merger applicants has a history of abuse of the public interest,
whether it is obscenity, violence, or racist or sexist programming, the
FCC will simply brush it aside because the proposed merger fits
within the existing ownership caps. And if it should do so, the courts
stand ready to review that determination.
Those loudly protesting the FCC’s decision seem to fall into three
groups: the general public, professional public interest advocates
and, of course, the Congress. Interestingly, there appears to be no
political dimension to the protests: both the left and right appear
34
unhappy with the FCC’s choices. But, let us look briefly at each
group. As to the general public, it is commonly known that
readership of daily newspapers has been declining for many years,
35
and that most Americans get the bulk of their news from television.
I find it difficult to believe that there is widespread concern among
the public about subtle and abstract issues of media diversity. The
great majority of the public comments submitted to the FCC were, to
be blunt, canned, and it is likely only a tiny percentage of those
putting their names on the comments had a very good grasp on the
rule changes adopted in the FCC’s decision. No doubt, as a pure
abstraction, the public would prefer diversity of viewpoint and more
33. One should call to mind the major role played by the FTC in the AOL-Time
Warner merger, and the careful review of the EchoStar-DirecTV merger last year by
the DOJ. See Frank Aherns, Satellite TV Deal Revised, and Rebuffed, WASH. POST, Nov. 1,
2002, at E1 (reporting that the DOJ filed suit in U.S. District Court in the District of
Columbia to stop this merger valued at $20 billion); Klein, supra note 22, at A1
(reporting the FTC settlement that allowed Time Warner to overcome antitrust
issues in its acquisition of AOL by allowing AOL’s internet rivals access to Time
Warner’s cable lines).
34. See Statement of Copps, supra note 11, at 7 (noting the nonpartisan nature of
the opposition stating that the FCC had heard bipartisan concern from more than
150 members of Congress).
35. See Sinclair Broad. Group v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 163 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing a
study indicating that nearly 70 percent of adults get their news from television).
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local news. But, abstractions do not take us very far in a web of
complex rules or elusive concepts like diversity, localism, and
multiple interrelated policy considerations.
The public interest professionals, of course, have a far more
sophisticated grasp on the subject matter. Without suggesting that
their views are not entitled to careful consideration, or that they do
not perform an important public service (perhaps precisely because
the general public is almost always poorly informed or too busy to get
involved in detailed analysis), we should also keep in mind that the
imperatives of such organizations are to mount campaigns,
demonstrate their usefulness to their supporters, justify their
existence, and seek notoriety.
The most puzzling locus of public criticism resides in the Congress.
Since that body itself directed the FCC to look skeptically at the
preexisting limits on ownership, one might have thought that the
FCC’s decision would have found favor on the Hill. Without
question, Congress must have been barraged with objections to the
FCC’s decision. Perhaps the lobbying groups that promoted the
hundreds of thousands of public comments also lobbied Congress. It
may also be that incumbents deem reelection campaigns less onerous
if the media are more localized and therefore more interested in
local political issues or more easily persuaded to provide favorable
coverage. Perhaps there was concern that too much concentration in
mass media ownership would give the media owners too influential a
voice in public discourse.
With respect to the wide spectrum of public unhappiness about the
decision, we can rely on the overarching discipline of the
marketplace. Commissioner Copps says we should “trust in the
36
wisdom of the American people.”
I agree.
Unlike the
Commissioner, however, I do not think the FCC should be a pollster,
and from many years of filing comments and pleadings at the FCC, as
noted above, one must be deeply skeptical about the independence
and depth of the hundreds of thousands of comments received at the
agency.
But it is the viewing/listening/reading public which
ultimately pays, directly and indirectly, for the mass media. If the
public does not like what the “media barons” are producing, it can
reduce or withdraw its support. The message will get through, and
will do so without undue and inappropriate tinkering, fine-tuning,
and value-setting by government officials.
Indeed, the less
government is involved in establishing, protecting, or advancing the
36. Statement of Copps, supra note 11, at 2.
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instruments of free speech, the better. Although of course, it is an
important and legitimate governmental function to assure freedom
of speech, as the Supreme Court and many other courts have held.
If the public wants more local programming, it can support entities
that are prepared to provide it. If the public is unwilling to pay for
such services, then it is unrealistic to demand their provision by
licensees who have stockholders and investors to satisfy. Nor does
this approach disregard the law’s emphasis on localism and diversity.
The FCC is not really in a position to compel the provision of more
37
or better local programming than the public is ready to support. Of
course, private sector markets are not perfect devices for resource
allocation; no social system is perfect. But as Harvard’s President
Summers noted, in expressing caution about the view that there is
something wrong with a system where we are able to buy bread only
because of the greed or profit motive of the people who make the
bread, we all have only so much altruism. “Far better to conserve it
by designing a system in which people’s wants will be satisfied by
individuals being selfish, and saving that altruism for . . . the many
38
social problems in this world that markets cannot solve.”
I close by coming back to the fundamental importance of diversity
of views in a free society. In a modern democratic post-industrial
society, the government is crucial for economic and political security.
But it is also, and simultaneously, the greatest danger to both,
because it possesses massive coercive powers over every one of us.
Second only to the separation of powers doctrine, the presence of a
free, robust press is the greatest counterbalance that the public
possesses.
I am far less concerned about large media
conglomerates—even if the local news is not locally produced—than
I am about the powers of a government which is not meaningfully
constrained by a powerful free press. And I do not believe that
hundreds or thousands of local media outlets possess such power or
39
can realistically challenge government authority. Organizations like
37. To draw again on personal experience, many years ago considerably more
emphasis was placed on showings concerning localism and diversity in licensing
(especially comparative licensing) proceedings.
By and large the proposals
considered by the FCC were the shallowest sort of window-dressing and it is to be
doubted that the public derived much meaningful value from such exercises.
38. Economics and Moral Questions, HARV. MAG., Nov.-Dec. 2003, at 64.
39. The recent flap about CBS’ decision not to broadcast a program allegedly
critical of President Reagan following political objections from various quarters,
merely serves to illustrate that even the largest of the media companies lives in a
world of many shifting constraints and that government or its proxies possesses the
power to intimidate even without actually taking any specific action. See Lisa de
Moraes, CBS Pulls ‘Reagans’ Miniseries Network: Show is Not ‘Balanced’, WASH. POST,
Nov. 5, 2003, at A1 (reporting that Viacom will air the program on Showtime, a pay
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the national networks, cable multiple owners, or the New York Times
and Washington Post, are far more likely to pose a significant
counterweight to any government tendency to abuse its powers than
are local outlets with limited resources. If we have to choose, or if
there is a balance to be struck here—and of course there is—I would
rather see strong media with somewhat less “diversity” and less
attention to local affairs than more local media each with fewer
40
capabilities to constrain government power.

cable channel instead of CBS because the company believed that “‘a free broadcast
network, available all over the public airwaves, has different standards than media
the public must pay to view’”).
40. I recognize that local government must also be subject to meaningful
constraints. Abusive municipal or county governments should be disciplined by
strong local media to the extent feasible. But it is within the larger governments,
state and federal, where serious abuse of government power is more likely to arise.

